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THOUGHTS ON ZAIBERT'S RETHINKING

Michael T. Cahill*
In responding to Leo Zaibert's Rethinking Punishment, I face a
daunting although not altogether unwelcome challenge, namely that I
am in firm and fundamental agreement with its central claims. Like
Zaibert, I have spent some time in the past arguing against deontic
retributivism (and addressing the work of some of the same scholars,
such as Michael Moore) 1 and have also spent some time arguing against
theoretical monism and in favor of a more pluralistic account of
punishment-not to spoil anything for potential readers of my work, but
the title of my book chapter "Punishment Pluralism" pretty much gives
the ending away in this regard. 2 In rejecting a deontic and monistic
account of retribution, I have advanced a framework I described as
consequentialistretributivism,3 which would probably prove to have some
modest distinctions from what Zaibert calls axiological retributivism if
we worked out every last detail, but our general perspectives certainly
have much more in common than not. We both reject the notion of
retribution as a deontic duty, would characterize it more as an intrinsic
good (or value), and recognize that it coexists with various other goods or
values that the state generally, and the criminal-justice system in
particular, must also pursue. I should note that, happily for my
confidence in the soundness of these views yet unhappily for my sense of
having made a unique contribution to the intellectual conversation,
Zaibert and I are not at all alone among recent commentators in adhering
4
to these positions.
*President, Joseph Crea Dean and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Vera
Bergelson for organizing the conference on Rethinking Punishment, at which I first
presented a version of these comments, and I thank Leo Zaibert and the other participants
in that conference, both for their reactions to my comments and for their thoughtful and
stimulating insights throughout the event.
See generally Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH.
1.
U. L. REV. 815 (2007) [hereinafter Real World].
See generally Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM:
2.
ESSAYS ON THEORY AND POLIcY (Mark D. White ed., 2011).

Real World, supra note 1, at 833-35.
3.
See Mitchell Berman, Rethinking Punishment, NOTRE DAME PHIL. REVS. (2018)
4.
(reviewing LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2018)) (noting other authors, including
Berman, who hold such views).
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Given this broad accord between my own views and Zaibert's, my
reactions tend to be more along the lines of observations and questions
than critiques. Indeed, some of them are derived from questions I get
from other people about my own work. Specifically, this response will
raise three lines of questions, asking about the implications of Zaibert's
work for (1) the justification of criminal law (as opposed to the
justification of punishment); (2) the implementation of punishment (via
law); and (3) the definition of punishment.
As opposed to deontic/monistic retributivism, axiologicallpluralistic
retributivism has the advantage of flexibility in accommodating the
tradeoffs necessary to implement a system of punishment in the real
world.5 It has the drawback, however, of failing to provide a robust
justification for the formation of such a system in the first place. Given
the existence of numerous competing demands on public resources, if
retributive punishment is not a moral obligation but just a good like other
goods, what compels the state to undertake its pursuit, rather than
seeking to provide those other goods instead? The pursuit of retributive
justice, rather than numerous other worthy social objectives, seems
particularly hard to defend given its considerable costs, not only in terms
of concrete resources (money) but also the likelihood that it will impede
or undercut other principled commitments, as by reflecting (or
entrenching) social inequality; the practical inevitability that it will
sometimes fail, or even be counterproductive on its own terms, due to
errors that will arise in seeking to impose retributive punishment (and
particularly Type I errors or "false positives" where suffering is imposed
on one who does not deserve it); the suffering it imposes on innocent third
parties as a spillover effect of punishing the deserving; and so on.
Zaibert largely ignores other tradeoffs involved in erecting a system
of criminal justice in favor of a particular focus on the tension between
retribution and forgiveness, but even that specific focus would only seem
to reduce the claim of justice on the public fisc relative to other concerns.
As Zaibert notes, all punishment comes with a kind of "moral remainder"
or taint or cost,6 so why not pursue other social projects that are more
straightforward in terms of their net benefits? Why not just have a
(perhaps more muscular than at present) tort system that can address
victims' needs and impose liability, but not punishment, on wrongdoers?
Zaibert offers thoughts on the purposes of punishment in the abstract, 7
but it's hard to see how axiological retributivism offers sufficient
5.

See generally Real World, supranote 1, at 864.

6.
LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT 227 (2017) [hereinafter RETHINKING
PUNISHMENT].

7.

See generally id.
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motivation to establish a criminal-justice system-unless that system is
also pursuing other worthwhile social ends along with retribution.
It seems to me that the most obvious candidate for a satisfying
argument in favor of establishing a criminal-justice system is that doing
so will prevent harm as well as promoting justice. Indeed, I think one
attractive feature of a pluralist account is that it acknowledges the
potential to pursue (as well as the need to accommodate or balance)
numerous different social and moral goals, including most obviously both
backward-looking retribution and forward-looking prevention. Yet
Zaibert offers no views of any kind about whether a pluralist system of
that sort, driven by both preventive and punitive aims, would be
appropriate or desirable or, if so, how it would adjudicate conflicts
between those purposes (and with other goals or values).
While purporting to be pluralistic, Zaibert's project seems entirely
uninterested in incorporating many obvious competing goals, values, or
costs, instead choosing to concern itself exclusively with the need to make
space for forgiveness alongside retribution. Of course, Zaibert is free to
define his project as he wishes,8 but in considering only the opposition
between retribution and one other consideration, I think he loses sight of
some of the richer opportunities (and concerns) a pluralistic perspective
can bring into view.
These other considerations become all the more significant if one
expects to effectuate an actual legal system that implements one's
understanding of the purpose(s) of punishment. Again, this may be a
function of Zaibert's sense of the scope of his own project, but it's not clear
whether his account offers, or could offer, concrete prescriptions or rules
for such a legal system to follow. Zaibert notes the difference between the
tasks of elaborating a philosophical and a legal account: after a lengthy
critique of the "morality system" of typical punishment theory on the
ground that it "fails to do justice to the complexity of human life and it is
thus simpleminded,"9 Zaibert notes that critiquing a legal system on the
same basis would "vergef] on the absurd"10 because it is "perfectly
sensible, if not downright inescapable"" that "the law sometimes needs

8.
On the other hand, Zaibert himself takes others to task for espousing pluralistic
views that he rejects as not "properly" pluralistic. Id. at 132-33 (referencing Duff); id. at
173 (referencing Hart). One could as easily say that a "pluralistic" account recognizing only
retribution and forgiveness as significant values-rather than attending to other values or
goals such as efficiency, equality, procedural fairness, harm prevention, privacy, and so
on-is not "properly" pluralistic. Even if proper (whatever that means), such an account
seems suboptimal in its narrowness.
Id. at 159.
9.
10.
Id. at 164.
11.
Id.

940

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:937

to draw bright lines and to simplify matters."1 2 If such is the case, Zaibert
seems to be acknowledging that his axiological and pluralistic account
might offer little guidance for law.
Yet I'm not sure such is the case. One might as easily say that the
legal system-which must operate in the real world, and therefore must
grapple with all the messiness and "complexity of human life"-should
be at special pains to avoid a "simpleminded" approach that sacrifices
justice for clarity. Perhaps Zaibert is right that the need for clear rules
will necessarily force the substantive law to be oversimplified relative to
a complex and pluralistic ideal theory, in which case the legal theorist
seeking to do justice (as opposed to the moral theorist seeking to capture
an abstracted ideal) will have to rely on procedural or institutional
features of the system to flesh out what the substantive law cannot
prescribe with clarity, or to correct for its crude overbreadth. Or perhaps
even that is not right-perhaps Zaibert lets the drafters of substantive
law off the hook too easily, when they can and should be expected to craft
rules with enough subtlety and sophistication to balance (or at last try to
balance) a plurality of aims. He spends little time considering the
question, and the reader interested in legal issues is left wondering
whether Zaibert's book speaks to such issues in any direct way.
Apart from these broad questions about Zaibert's understanding of
the general relation between law and punishment theory, I'm curious
about the specific relation between law and one feature of Zaibert's own
theory. Much of Rethinking Punishment is devoted to analysis of, and
frequently arguments against, other thinkers, but the book does offer a
central affirmative argument, namely, that punishment needs to
recognize a role for forgiveness alongside retribution. 13 But is this an
argument only about the concept of punishment, or is it also (or can it be)
an argument about the legal institution of punishment? If the latter,
what role is forgiveness to play in the criminal-justice system?
One challenge to the possible recognition of forgiveness as a goal or
animating value of criminal law, at least along the lines Zaibert favors,
is his insistence that forgiveness must be "unconditional,"1 4 meaning that
it is not predicated on the wrongdoer's repentance or promise not to
reoffend (or any other "transactional" consideration) and also that it is
never obligatory. 15 Yet if a convicted criminal defendant never needed to
do anything in particular to earn forgiveness, and also could not be
entitled to forgiveness no matter what s/he did, what legal rules or even
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id. at 171-75.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 201-02.
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guidelines could possibly exist to suggest when forgiveness could or
should be offered, and when withheld? How could its transmission (or
not) be anything other than ad hoc, unprincipled, and arbitrary: that is
to say, lawless?
Further, in the context of criminal law, who forgives: the victim, the
state, or both? Does the state reduce or eliminate punishment based on
the victim's authorization of such forgiveness, or is it the state, as
punisher and as the "victim" of an offense against its dictates, who is also
the forgiver? If it is the state who forgives, does its act of forgiveness
reflect, or cultivate, some positive moral character on the state's part, as
might be said of a person who has the fortitude and generosity of spirit
to forgive one who wrongs her?
Moreover-and this may only reflect my own confusion and lack of
familiarity with the literature on forgiveness-but I'm not entirely
certain what forgiveness means, or entails, in the context of punishment.
16
Zaibert seems to hold the view that forgiveness means absolution, that
is, a decision to free the wrongdoer not only from punishment but from
blame. (If so, just how and why the forgiver has the power to erase the
moral blameworthiness of the wrongdoer's act is somewhat mysterious.)
Alternatively, forgiveness might only mean forbearance: the blame
remains, but no punishment is imposed even though the wrongdoer is
fully eligible for it. In that case, one forgives, but does not forget.
Legally, the first version would seem to demand that the government
refrain not only from imposing punishment but even from imposing the
stigma of a conviction; presumably all charges must be dropped rather
than instituting a legal judgment that the defendant is "guilty." Yet how
can the system forgive a wrong before finding that the wrong occurred?
Once a conviction is entered, signifying proof beyond reasonable doubt of
the defendant's wrongdoing, it seems hard for the system to forget as well
as forgive-to say that this conviction is not only one that will not be
punished, but is somehow null and void altogether. The second version
seems to more easily admit of implementation within a legal system,
which can impose the stigma of conviction while declining to impose any
(further) punishment.17
But is the stigma of conviction itself part of the punishment? That
question leads me to my third topic. When I first heard about Rethinking

16.

See id. at 202.

17.

See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE 210-12

(2006). A more robust set of verdict options, beyond the standard "guilty" and "not guilty,"
might facilitate formal judgments of a "blameless violation" as well as judgments of liability
without punishment, enabling the system to implement some form of the first version of
forgiveness as well as the second. Id.
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Punishment, I thought (and rather hoped) that its project was to rethink
not the justification of punishment (a topic that has received much
attention from moral and legal theorists), but the meaning of
punishment, which turns out to have received much less consideration,
notwithstanding its significance and what one might take to be the
conceptual priority of having to define a practice before one can attempt
to justify it.18 Indeed, even as there seems to be progress toward a broad
consensus (if by no means universal) view regarding the justification of
punishment, there seems to be an ever-larger body of scholarly work
asking important questions about the very nature and scope of the
concept.1 9
On one hand, a number of scholars who think about the idea of
punishment broadly have raised basic questions about aspects of
punishment that were previously stipulated, assumed, or left
unconsidered: for example, whether punishment must be intended as
such by the party imposing it;20 whether punishment must be
experienced or understood as such by the party receiving it;21 and
whether punishment must come from the state. 22 A distinct but related
question that has received substantial attention recently is whether the
nature of the retributive "desert claim" is that wrongdoers deserve
suffering, or that they deserve punishment.23
On the other hand, a lot of other scholars who write about particular
real-world practices have been asking whether, or arguing that, a lot of
sanctions other than criminal sentences should count as punishment.
18.
To be clear (and fair), Zaibert did devote some attention to the definition of
punishment in an earlier book. See LEO ZAIBERT, PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION 28-37
(2006). Even so, in my view, the various issues surrounding the meaning of punishment are
rich, varied, and important enough to merit an extended treatment.
19.
See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
20.
See Adam J. Kolber, UnintentionalPunishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012); cf.
Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1353 (2008) (discussing role of intent in constitutional understanding of punishment).
21.
Compare John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness
and Punishment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2009), and Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative
Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2009) (arguing that punishment is properly
defined, and calibrated, by subjective experience of recipient), with Dan Markel & Chad
Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive Justice, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 907 (2010), and Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David C. Gray, Beyond
Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605 (2011) (arguing against
"subjectivist" claims).
22.
Compare, e.g., ALON HAREL, WHY LAW MATTERS 96-103 (2014) (asserting that
the "intrinsically public good" of punishment can be carried out only by the state), with
ZAIBERT, supra note 18, at 16-28, 182-202 (arguing justification of punishment must be
same for non-state actors as for state).
23.
See, e.g., David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619 (2010)
(arguing that "subjectivist" scholars inappropriately conflate punishment with suffering).
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Indeed, recent years have seen a number of scholarly articles whose titles
as Punishment," with the blank being filled
or theses take the form "
in by any of various legal impositions that may fall within or outside the
criminal-justice system and may or may not be imposed on the basis of
past wrongdoing, such as pretrial detention, 24 immigration detention, 25
deportation, 26 Citizenship revocation, 27 and punitive damages. 28
It seems to me that a pluralist approach, or what Zaibert might call
a non-simpleminded approach, toward the question of punishment's
justification can also address some of this confusion or debate about its
underlying nature. Such a perspective can recognize not only that there
are multiple, sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting goals or
purposes (what some might, rather misleadingly, call "justifications") of
punishment, but also that there are multiple features of punishment.
Various kinds of sanctions or impositions may have some, most, or all of
those features, and may demand or admit of different justifications
depending on the feature(s) they possess. Even some of the classic
normative purposes of punishment seem to interact poorly with the
classic descriptive understanding of what punishment is: namely,
suffering imposed on a wrongdoer for a wrong. Consider incapacitation,
regularly advanced as one of the "purposes" or "justifications" of
punishment. Wrongdoing is neither a necessary nor sufficient basis for
incapacitation, and suffering is neither a necessary nor sufficient
component of incapacitation. Of course, there are obviously modes of
punishment that involve incapacitation, and cases of incapacitation that
are imposed as punishment. They overlap, but are by no means
congruent.
A robustly pluralist account has the potential to tease out all of the
different purposes of punishment-or other meaningfully similar
sanctions or impositions, whether labeled "punishment" or not-and all
of the values that might constrain punishment, and to consider which of
those goals or concerns are implicated by a given practice or instance of
Cf. Adam J. Kolber, Against ProportionalPunishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141
24.
(2013) (raising questions about relationship between pretrial detention and punishment).
E.g., Cesar Cuauhtemoc Garcia Hernandez, Immigration Detention as
25.
Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014).
E.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A HistoricalAnalysis of the
26.
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 115 (1999); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at
Least Some of the Constitution's CriminalProcedureProtections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L.
REV. 305 (2000).
E.g., Shai Levi, Citizenship Revocation as Punishment: On the Modern Duties of
27.
Citizens and their CriminalBreach, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 783 (2011).
E.g., Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Problem: Punitive
28.
Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003).

944

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:937

a practice. Just as such an account can enable greater nuance in
considering the normative basis of punishment, perhaps it can also
facilitate a more nuanced view of the concept of punishment itself, and of
the various social practices that might fall within its scope, or on its
periphery or border, or adjacent but close enough to raise similar
justificatory concerns. Indeed, such a view might ultimately warrant
rejection of the catchall term "punishment" in favor of a more
sophisticated, and particular, examination of individual practices, the
goals they pursue, and the concerns they raise.

